Endogenous growth and intellectual property rights: a North-South modelling proposal

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Abstract

In what form should the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) be treated in an endogenous growth model? What are the effects of introducing IPR into a North-South endogenous growth model? In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium endogenous growth model that emphasizes the IPR enforcement effects on growth, in a scenario of North-South technological knowledge diffusion. The economy consists of three sectors, and firms are engaged in step-by-step innovation. In line with the literature, we introduce an IPR parameter that makes imitation more difficult. We find that, in steady state, the increases in IPR protection result in decreases in the growth rate. This result is in line with the literature, which argues that the enforcement of IPR does not always have a positive effect on economic growth and highlights that there is much more work to be done in this field of study, given that the existing results are not consensual. To sum up, we present some suggestions for future research which can help to clarify the relationship between IPR and endogenous growth.

Keywords: Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), economic growth, North-South model.

JEL-codes: O33, O34, O41.

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1. Introduction

There is a broad consensus in the literature regarding the understanding of innovation as vital for economic growth (e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004; Acemoglu, 2012). Moreover, Intellectual Property Rights (hereafter referred to as IPR) are recognized as relevant for understanding innovation and thus emerge as a crucial determinant for economic growth analysis (e.g., Gould and Gruben, 1996; Glass and Saggi, 2002; Sener, 2006; Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 2010).

According to Falvey et al. (2009) and Chu et al. (2012), we would expect a positive impact of stronger IPR on economic growth. Indeed, increasing patent protection raises the R&D incentives and improves technological progress, which in turn decreases economic growth volatility, proving that a superior patent breadth leads to a higher expected growth rate. Additionally, it is common among empirical studies to find a net positive effect between IPR protection (measured by a system of patents, for instance) and innovation. In fact, the empirical evidence suggests a positive relationship between this kind of protection and innovation, despite certain characteristics of the sample, such as the type of countries in the study (for instance, the above result is significant mostly for low and high income countries but not for middle income countries), may bring some bias into the analyses (for a detailed analysis of such differences see Azevedo et al., 2012).

Within the literature on economic growth, important contributions to the field of IPR have been made in juxtaposition with international trade. Several questions have emerged, such as: what is the optimal enforcement of IPR in a North (South) open economy? What are the effects of introducing IPR into a North-South endogenous growth model? These questions are in line with our research aims for this paper, as will be made clear below.

Several papers have used a North-South endogenous growth set up to deal with the above mentioned questions, specifically in terms of what is the optimal enforcement of
IPR protection. Sá et al. (2009), for example, discuss this topic in relation to a small and developing open economy, analysing whether there should be no enforcement on the one hand or complete enforcement on the other. Their results point to the dominance of a positive relationship between IPR enforcement and welfare, albeit showing that, when departing from weak protection choices, some exceptions may be found. Wu (2010) observes that there is no consensus in the literature on the relationship between IPR protection and economic growth, since this relationship relies on the development level of the country, which imposes different necessities of innovation and imitation that affect the impact of IPR protection. Mondal and Gupta (2009) also propose an endogenous growth model that analyses the effects of IPR protection on economic growth, concluding that a strategy of strengthening IPR in the South may lead to welfare gains in both the North and the South (although the marginal welfare gain is higher in the former than in the latter), which leads to a rise in the Northern innovation rate and a decrease in both the Southern rate of imitation and the South-North wage in the new steady-state equilibrium. Thus, this strategy has a positive effect on the steady state equilibrium growth rate in both countries.

In this paper, we also aim to understand the effect of introducing IPR protection into a North-South endogenous growth model. Despite the important contributions that have been emerging to this research framework, the analysis is still in its infancy. In order to assess this latest evidence, we have conducted a simple bibliometric exercise in order to gain a more quantitative picture of the research patterns concerned with IPR in the specific framework of Endogenous Growth Models (EGM). This exercise is based on two datasets gathered from the bibliographical database SciVerse Scopus.¹ Our first dataset was

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¹ Scopus is the largest abstract and citation database of peer-reviewed literature and quality web sources, having been designed and developed for over 500 users and librarians internationally. This dataset includes the abstracts and references of 15,000 peer-reviewed journals from more than 4,000 international publishers.
obtained using the terms “Endogenous Growth Model” (EGM) as search words (in all fields and choosing article and review as document type), whereas the second dataset was gathered from a similar search using the terms “Intellectual Property Rights” and “Endogenous Growth Model” simultaneously (EGM+IPR). The first set encompasses 2004 articles, while the second only comprises 71 articles.²

Figure 1 represents the temporal evolution of the number of published articles broadly about EGM and specifically about EGM+IPR. Articles on EGM (alone) have been appearing since 1991, whereas the first year in which we find published articles concerning both IPR and EGM is 1998. This comprehensive search, whose first recorded entry is in 1998, sustains the argument that the analysis of IPR in the context of endogenous growth models is a rather new research field. Furthermore, despite the visible and sustained increase in EGM related research from 1995, the number of publications relating to EGM+IPR has remained almost stable over the years in focus.

As Figure 1 shows, the relative weight of EGM+IPR in total EGM is small, with a peak occurring in 2012. However, there is no clear evidence of growth in relation to this weight in the analysed time period. Faced with the fact that this line of research has only recently been undertaken, we argue that there are still important caveats that have to be dealt with, and in our paper we intend to contribute to limiting their scope, our original aim and main motivation being to explain the IPR enforcement effects on growth, in the presence of North-South technological knowledge diffusion.

² This search procedure is unrestricted and comprehensive in the sense that the engine searches in the whole text. Even so, it is important, bearing in mind that any bibliometric exercise bares a limitation concerning the impossibility of the chosen keyword being able to embrace the whole research in analysis (in our case, IPR and endogenous growth models related research).
As starting points for our modelling proposal, we consider Connolly and Valderrama’s (2005) and Afonso’s (2012) studies, both using a similar endogenous growth framework, which propose analogous building blocks in their models and achieve interesting results.

Nevertheless, these two articles report distinct results. Connolly and Valderrama (2005) focus on welfare and growth within a dynamic argument, arguing in favour of free trade, particularly from the point of view of developing countries. Afonso (2012) also focuses on technological knowledge diffusion issues, but in relation to the dynamics of wage inequality.

Thus our framework is based on Connolly and Valderrama (2005) and Afonso (2012), but we also draw on some studies specifically oriented towards IPR within EGM, such as those of Mondal and Gupta (2009), Sá et al. (2009) and Wu (2010). As in the first two studies, we also consider a model consisting of two economies (North and South) and three productive sectors in each economy: final goods, intermediate goods and designs (R&D sector). However, in comparison with Afonso (2012), we drop the hypothesis of
distinct types of labour, and we do not consider transportation costs separately as in Connolly and Valderrama (2005). Moreover, we introduce a new parameter into the probability of imitation, in order to capture the effect of IPR protection, since it is an adequate procedure for showing that IPR enforcement aims at constraining imitation. Our main motivation is to contribute to overcoming the present gap in the literature on endogenous growth, given that most of the related literature, as has been shown above with the bibliometric account, has treated IPR protection as a secondary issue.

Connolly and Valderrama (2005) make reference to IPR, but commence their analysis by assuming the absence of both domestic and international IPR enforcement. Afterwards, they introduce IPR, which force Southern imitators to pay a license fee to Northern innovators, and model them simultaneously as an increase in the imitative research fixed cost and a reduction in the fixed cost of innovative research. The authors show that the presence of IPR can positively affect both Northern and Southern welfare and argue that, in a world where growth is driven by technology and Southern research affects that developed in the North, Southern nations can benefit from some degree of IPR to foreign firms. Additionally, they state that the imposition of a low level of IPR leads to superior steady state growth rates compared with Southern trade liberalization alone. Moreover, they show that the gain associated with the increase in IPR is greater for both countries, as long as the South remains open to imports of Northern intermediate goods.

Afonso (2012) does not ignore IPR, but does not explicitly model them either. For instance, the author argues that the investment in a blueprint can only be claimed if profits are positive within a given period in the future and if this is guaranteed by both costly R&D and internal patents enforcement, that is, a national IPR system which protects the leader firm’s monopoly of that quality good internally though not worldwide, while
simultaneously spreading learned knowledge to other national firms in line with Connolly and Valderrama, 2005).

Connolly and Valderrama (2005) and Afonso (2012) introduce IPR enforcement, but deal with this issue in a simplified manner because their main purpose was not to discuss IPR. Hence, departing from modelling frames similar to these studies, we intend to focus our research on IPR. As mentioned above, we introduce a new parameter into the probability of imitation, which is treated by following the consensual position in the literature, that IPR protection makes imitation more difficult (e.g., Park and Lippoldt, 2005; Nair-Reichert and Duncan, 2008; Trommetter, 2010; Ivus, 2011). Nevertheless, it is important to stress that there is no agreement regarding the best way to introduce IPR into this type of model (see, for example, Mondal and Gupta, 2009; Sá et al., 2009; Wu 2010).

Lastly, our results are related to the IPR literature (see Chu, 2009). This literature considers that the IPR effect on economic growth is unclear. That is to say, while some studies identify a positive relationship, others identify negative or inconclusive results. However, our results are in line with Furukawa (2007) and Eicher and Garcia-Peñalosa (2008), who refute the idea that stronger IPR are always better.

The present paper is structured as follows. After a brief introduction, Section 2 presents the set up of the model. Section 3 focuses in detail on the equilibrium and Section 4 concludes.

2. Set up of the model

We assume two economies with three sectors: intermediate goods, final goods and designs (R&D sector). The former sector operates in a monopolistic competition scenario, whereas the latter two operate under perfect competition. In particular, the R&D sector is closely associated with the intermediate goods sector: when successful, R&D activities result in innovations in the North and imitations in the South, and as in Romer (1990), provide
inputs to the intermediate goods sector. In turn, quality adjusted intermediate goods and labour are inputs into the final goods sector. Thus, we use a standard quality ladder model, which, by considering two countries, also follows the contributions of authors such as Grossman and Helpman (1991b), and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997). The final good is consumed and the fraction that is not consumed is used in R&D activities or in the production of intermediate goods.

2.1. Final goods

In the production of the competitive final good, we have established some particular premises: (i) there is a fixed number of intermediate sectors, \( J \); (ii) only the top quality good will be sold under limit pricing; (iii) the quality of each good rises with successful innovations; (iv) each quality upgrade can be considered as a step further up the ladder and the dimension of each step shows the dimension of quality upgrades. Technological knowledge is thus incorporated into intermediate goods and economic growth in each country is determined by technological developments in the quality of available inputs, independently of the country of origin. Final good can be produced both in North (country \( i=N \)) and in South (country \( i=S \)), by perfectly competitive firms, and the constant returns to scale production function at time \( t \) is:

\[
Y_i(t) = A_i L_i^\alpha \sum_{j=1}^J (z_i(j, t))^{1-\alpha}, \quad i \in \{N, S\},
\]

where:

\[
z_i(j, t) = q^{k_{i,N}(j,t)} x_i(j, t).
\]

The exogenous productivity level is given by a positive variable \( A_i \), which depends on the country’s institutions, related, for example, to government services, property rights and tax law; we assume \( A_S < A_N \). The labour input used in the production of the final good is represented by \( L, \alpha \in ]0,1[ \) being the labour share. \( z_i(j, t) \) is the quality adjusted intermediate good \( j \) at time \( t \). \( q \), an exogenously fixed constant larger than 1, expressing
the size of each quality improvement achieved by each success in R&D. The steps of the quality ladder are represented by \( k \), with greater \( k \) indicating greater quality. The quality adjusted rank of \( j \) will increase from 1 (\( q^0 = 1 \)) to \( q^1 \) with the first innovation, to \( q^2 \) with the second and to \( q^k \) with the \( k_{j}^{th} \) innovation, which is used due to the profit maximizing limit pricing by the monopolist producers. The quantity \( x_i(j, t) \) of \( j \) is used along with labour to create \( Y_i(t) \). (1 − \( \alpha \)) is the aggregate intermediate goods input share.

In whichever country, for a given \( p_l(t) \) and \( p(j, t) \), the implicit demand for each \( j \) by the representative producer of \( i_{th} \) final good is:

\[
x_i(j, t) = L_i \left[ A_i (1 - \alpha)^{\frac{p_l(t)}{p(j, t)}} \right]^{\frac{1}{2}} q^k N(j, t) \left[ 1 - \alpha \right],
\]

where \( p_l(t) \) is the price of the final good \( i \) and \( p(j, t) \) is the price of intermediate good \( j \).

Replacing \( x_i(j, t) \) in (2) with (3), using the resulting expression in (1), and substituting \( p_l(t) \) by the \( MC_i \) and \( p(j, t) \) by the limite prices presented in the next subsection, the supply of final good in each country is:

\[
Y_N(t) = A_N^{\frac{1}{2}} \left( 1 - \alpha \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} L_N Q_N \left[ n_{NN} + n_{NS} \left( 1 + \tau_{xs} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} MC_S^{\frac{1}{2}} + n_S q^{\frac{1}{2}} \right].
\]

\[
Y_S(t) = A_S^{\frac{1}{2}} \left( \frac{1 - \alpha}{q} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} L_S Q_N \left[ n_{NN} \left( \frac{MC_S^{\frac{1}{2}}}{1 + \tau_{xs}} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} + n_{NS} + n_s q^{\frac{1}{2}} \left( \frac{MC_S^{\frac{1}{2}}}{1 + \tau_{xs}} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} \right],
\]

\[
Q_N = \sum_{j=1}^{l} \frac{k N(j, t)(1 - \alpha)}{a}.
\]

\( Q_N \) is the Northern aggregate quality index; thus, aggregate production in both countries depends on \( Q_N \), since limit pricing with free trade guarantees that only the highest quality technology will be used. Consequently, even when an intermediate good is produced in the South, its quality level is the same as the prime Northern quality level.

In a scenario of perfect competition, the marginal cost, \( MC \) matches the price of the final good, \( p \); i.e., \( MC_i = p_i \). In this sense, the \( MC \) of producing an intermediate good is not dependent on its degree of quality and is similar across all domestic sectors. We
normalize to one the Northern $MC$, $MC_N = 1$, and we assume that the arguments yield equilibrium $MC$s that are larger in the North than in the South, $MC_N > MC_S$.

2.2. Intermediate goods

What will the country producing the intermediate goods used in the production of final goods be? The answer depends not only on trade barriers, but also on each country’s degree of technological sophistication. As the North is technologically more advanced, it is the innovator in pushing the world’s technology frontier further. However, we consider that the South may improve its domestic technological knowledge by imitating Northern technology, at least until the gap is eliminated. When the knowledge of how to produce an intermediate good is internally available, it can be used in the production of final goods.

The $MC$ of producing an intermediate good is the same as the $MC$ of producing the final good, $MC_i$. We assume that $0 < MC_S < MC_N = 1$, which allows the South to produce the same quality level, $k$, at a price lower than its Northern competitor. This makes it possible for a successfully imitating Southern firm to enter the international market.

Additionally, we consider that within a country the knowledge of how to make a good is free.\(^3\) Distinguishing between domestic IPR and international IPR, we suppose that the former are protected. That is, the innovator is domestically protected by a system of domestic IPR, and in a set of Schumpeterian creative destruction, continues as the best quality producer. However, our focus is on international IPR, which appear to protect the innovator North country from foreign copies. Hence, from now on, we mention IPR protection to refer to international IPR protection.

\(^3\) There are countries that simultaneously have enforced patents which protect the lead firm’s national monopoly of a specific quality good and the associated knowledge. Hence, the other national firms cannot use this knowledge without any cost to themselves.
Following the contributions of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, Ch. 7) and Afonso (2012), according to the demand equation (3), the monopolist intermediate goods firms maximize their profits throughout the optimal price, given by the following mark up:

\[ p(k, j, t) = p(j, t) = p = \frac{1}{1 - \alpha}, \]  

(7)

which is constant over time, across firms and for all quality degrees. The nearer \( \alpha \) is to zero, the lower is the mark up and thus the less room there is for monopoly pricing.

The kind of competition handled by the firm influences the expected profits. There are three types of firms: North firms facing North competition, \( n_{NN} \); North firms facing South competition, \( n_{NS} \); South imitating firms facing North competition, \( n_{S} \). Thus, there are \( J \) sectors, \( J = n_{S} + n_{NS} + n_{NN} \), and bearing in mind \( I_{N} \) and \( I_{S} \) (the probability of successful innovation and imitation, respectively, which will be presented in Subsection 2.3), \( n_{NN} \), \( n_{NS} \) and \( n_{S} \) depend on entry and exit:

\[ \dot{n}_{NN} = I_{N}(1 - I_{S})n_{NS} - [I_{N}I_{S} + (1 - I_{N})I_{S}]n_{NN} \]  

(8a)

\[ \dot{n}_{NS} = I_{N}(I_{S}n_{NN} + n_{S}) - [(1 - I_{N})I_{S} + I_{N}(1 - I_{S})]n_{NS} \]  

(8b)

\[ \dot{n}_{S} = (1 - I_{N})I_{S}n_{NN}^{f} + n_{NS}^{f} - I_{N}n_{S} \]  

(8c)

Thus, Northern firms challenging Northern rivalry select a limit price slightly below \( q \) times the lowest price at which the preceding innovator could sell, as the good is \( q \) times more productive than the precursor. \( MC_{N}=1 \) is the lowest price at which the preceding innovator could sell in the North and \( (1 + \tau_{xs}) \) is the lowest price at which the good could be sold in the South, as it is subject to Southern tariffs on intermediates and \textit{ad-valorem} transportation costs, \( \tau_{xs} \). Thus, Northern firms facing North competition, \( n_{NN} \), have two limit prices: \( P_{NN} = qMC_{N} = q \) for national sales and \( P_{NN}^{f} = q(1 + \tau_{xs}) \) for sales to the

\[ ^{4} \text{We fix } J = 1, \text{ so that } n's \text{ will be the share of the Southern market kept by each group (Connolly and Valderrama, 2005).} \]
At these limit prices, world sales of all older technologies will be wiped out. Similarly, Northern firms challenging Southern competition, $n_{NS}$, have limit prices $P^f_{NS} = qMC_S \left(1 + \tau_{xS} \right)$ internally and $P^f_{NS} = qMC_S$ in a foreign country. Southern firms, $n_S$, always face Northern competition and impose limit prices $P^f_S = 1$ for sales abroad and $P_S = 1 + \tau_{xS}$ for home sales. In each intermediate good, the firm with the highest quality employs pricing to remove sales of lower quality. If $q(1 - \alpha)$ is greater than $MC_N = 1$, the leader will use the monopoly pricing. However, if $q(1 - \alpha)$ is less than $MC_N = 1$, the leader of each industry will use the limit pricing to capture the total market. In Connolly and Valderrama (2005), the leader in each industry uses limit pricing to remove sales of lower quality. Innovations are drastic, so the dimension of quality upgrades is large enough for a firm in the North to control the international market with a unique quality level upgrade over a Southern imitation, ($q > \left(\frac{1+\tau_{xS}}{MC_S} \right)$). A firm in the South can win the worldwide market by imitating the leader in the North (and fixing a smaller price). Hence, there is a Vernon-type product cycle whereby production moves from the North to the South with successful imitation, and back to the North with new innovation.

### 2.3. R&D sector

Economic growth is boosted by R&D activities. Firms decide the amount of resources to apply, based on the expected present value of profits from successful research, which depends on the probabilities of innovation and imitation. In the North, R&D activities lead

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5 “This holds if $q(1 - \alpha) \leq 1$. If instead, $q(1 - \alpha) > 1$, then Northern firms will use monopoly pricing” (Connolly and Valderrama, 2005: 13).

6 Even without internal IPR protection, the presence of any determined cost to mimic will successfully exclude domestic copy of a national product.

7 There are different scenarios of drastic innovations in the literature (for example, the General Purpose Technologies, usually christened GPT) but, in the present work, we will not discuss these.
to the emergence of innovative blueprints for manufacturing intermediate goods, which improve their quality. In an intermediate goods sector $j$, currently at quality level $k_N(j,t)$, $I_N(j,t)$ represents the probability at time $t$ that the $(k_N(j,t) + 1)^{th}$ innovation will occur and will follow a Poisson process. Similarly, we also consider that these designs are internally protected through IPR and that the leader firm in each $j$ (that is, the one holding the latest patent) uses limit pricing to guarantee monopoly. The probabilities of successful innovation and imitation are essential to R&D, as the profit yields accruing during each period $t$ to the monopolist and the duration of the monopoly power contribute to the value of the top patent. These probabilities creatively extinguish either the extant top design (e.g. Aghion and Howitt, 1992) or the production in the North (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1991a, Ch. 12) influencing the monopoly duration. $I_N(j,t)$ is given by:

$$I_N(j,t) = y_N(j,t)\beta_N q^{k_N(j,t)}\xi_N^{-1}q^{-\alpha^{-1}k_N(j,t)},$$

(9)

where $y_N(j,t)$ is the flow of final good resources in the North allocated to R&D in $j$, which defines our set up as a lab equipment model (e.g., Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991); $\beta_N q^{k_N(j,t)}$ (with $\beta_N > 0$) denotes learning by previous domestic R&D, as a positive learning effect of accumulated public knowledge from earlier successful R&D (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1991a, Ch. 12; Connolly, 2003); $\xi_N^{-1}q^{-\alpha^{-1}k_N(j,t)}$ (with $\xi_N > 0$) is the adverse effect (cost of complexity) caused by the rising complexity of quality upgrades (e.g., Kortum, 1993, 1997; Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 2007).

Since the South is less developed, though not by too great a margin, we consider that there are intermediate goods for which $k_S < k_N$, implying that there are a number of top qualities produced in both countries even without international trade (i.e. for which

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8 As will become clear later on, the technical reason for the existence of the production function parameter $\alpha$ in (9) is the complexity cost, which along with the positive learning effect exactly balances the positive influence of the quality rung on the profits of each top intermediate good firm. In this sense, $\beta_N$ reflects a positive spillover effect from past experience and $\xi_N$ is a fixed cost of innovative research.
The existence of international trade allows the South to gain access to all the best qualities so that it becomes an imitator, increasing the instantaneous probability of successful imitation of the top quality \( k_N(j, t) \) in \( j \), \( I_S(j, t) \), given by

\[
I_S(j, t) = y_S(j, t) \beta_S q^{k_S(j, t)} \frac{e^\varphi}{\xi_S Q^\sigma} q^{-\delta} \frac{k_N(j, t)}{\alpha} \left( \frac{1}{Q} \right)^{1-\delta}
\]

\[
= y_S(j, t) \beta_S \frac{e^\varphi}{\xi_S Q^\sigma} \hat{Q}^{-\sigma} q^{k_N(j, t)\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha}},
\]

(10)

where \( y_S(j, t) \) represents the flow of domestic final good resources allocated to R&D in intermediate good \( j \), \( \beta_S q^{k_S(j, t)} \) denotes the learning by past imitations (and we assume that \( 0 < \beta_S < \beta_N \) and \( k_S < k_N \), i.e. we consider that the learning by past imitations is lower than the learning by past innovations). In a similar way, according to the empirical findings of Mansfield et al. (1981), the fixed cost of imitation \( \xi_S \) is supposed to be smaller than the innovation cost \( \xi_N \). In line with Connolly and Valderrama (2005), the cost of imitation \( \frac{\xi_S Q^\sigma}{e^\varphi} \) is affected by two new factors. Firstly, it depends positively on the sector \( j \) South/North technology ratio \( \hat{q}_j \), and indicates the increasing cost of imitation as Southern technology approaches Northern technology. Therefore, there are decreasing returns to imitation since the group of goods that can be selected for imitation diminishes. In this context, \( \sigma \) influences the speed with which the cost of imitation increases as the technology gap drops.\(^9\) Secondly, the cost depends negatively on the interaction between the two countries, \( \varphi \). This is quantified by the South’s openness to imports of intermediate goods, \( M \), scaled by the aggregate North technology level, \( Q_N = \sum_{j=1}^{J} q^{k_N(j, t)\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} \). Once the imitation cost increases and the technology gap between North and South decreases,

\(^9\) Once the experience obtained from imitation rises one-to-one with \( \hat{q} \), \( \sigma \) has to be greater than 1 for the probability of imitation to decrease as \( \hat{q} \) rises. This assures a smooth transition.
both the probability of imitation and the probability of innovation are modified during transition towards the steady state.

Also in (10), $\delta \in [0,1]$ measures the degree of IPR enforcement in the South, $\varphi = \left( \frac{M}{Q_N} \right)^\eta$ and $\tilde{Q} = \frac{q_S^{i_1(j,t)} j}{q_N^{i_1(j,t)} j} = \frac{Q_S}{Q_N} = \tilde{q}_j$ (with $0 < \tilde{Q} < 1$). Hence, we fix a negative relationship between $\delta$ and $l_S(j,t)$: the greater the parameter $\delta$, the greater the degree of IPR enforcement in the South and the smaller the probability of successful imitation. Moreover, we consider that the smaller is the distance to the technological frontier (the higher $\tilde{Q}$) the more these countries will implement IPR laws.

In general, developed countries have higher levels of IPR protection (e.g., Lai and Qiu, 2003; Grossman and Lai, 2004; Naghavi, 2007; Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 2010). Nevertheless, it seems that in future research it will be necessary to verify whether the North has implemented IPR laws more or less rigorously compared with the South, since some other issues emerge from this discussion. For instance, it is interesting to analyze the causality effects that may here be involved: are developing economies less developed because they have weaker institutions, which also implies inability to apply stronger enforcement of IPR laws, or do these less developed countries fix a low level of protection, having also a low enforcement of IPR laws, because they intend to stimulate imitation in order to grow faster? We should bear in mind that some studies state that the relationship between the degree of IPR and innovation is not linear: it has an inverted U-shape (e.g., Furukawa, 2007, 2010; Panagopoulos, 2009).

Following this line of reasoning, Kim et al. (2012) empirically study not only the importance of the strength of IPR, but also the type of IPR suitable for distinct levels of economic development. The main conclusion of this study is that patent protection influences R&D intensity, and thus affects economic growth. Moreover, the results show that patent protection improves innovation (and hence economic growth) in countries
where there is the capacity to develop innovative R&D. Thus, according to Kim et al. (2012), on the one hand R&D has a positive effect on economic growth in high income countries and in those middle income countries that use intellectual property protection to reward imitative and adaptive R&D, while on the other hand petty patents or utility models are positively linked with the R&D intensity of middle to low income countries.

The results of Xu and Chiang (2005) state that high income countries enjoy both internal technology and foreign technology, which is included in imported capital goods, whereas middle income countries benefit from technology spillovers from both foreign patents and imported capital goods. Finally, low income countries receive essential benefits from foreign patents. Moreover, they conclude that government policies regarding IPR protection and trade openness have significant effects on foreign technology spillovers in middle income and poor nations. In undertaking this study, the authors use the index of patent rights constructed by Ginarte and Park (1997), (whose value varies from zero to five, where zero is the weakest and five is the strongest value), as the measure of IPR and we can verify that, in the sample, the US – North – has the highest value of IPR (4.55), while Indonesia – South – has the lowest (0.64). If we place the values in ascending order, it is possible to confirm that in general Southern countries have lower levels of IPR protection, whereas Northern countries have higher levels.

2.4. Consumers

We assume that the Northern consumer makes consumption and savings decisions so that he/she can maximize the present value lifetime utility:

$$\max_{\{c_N,c_h\}} \int_0^\infty u(c_h)e^{-pt} dt$$

(11)

$$u(c_N) = \left( \frac{c_N^{1-\theta} - 1}{1 - \theta} \right)$$

(12)
\[ \bar{C}_N = C_N^k C_S^{f(1-k)} \]  
(13)

\[ \dot{a} = r_N a + w - E_N \]  
(14)

\[ E_N = P_N C_N + P_S^f C_S^f \]  
(15)

\( u(\bar{C}_N) \) is the instantaneous utility function with a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution (CIES), where \( \bar{C}_N \) is the North composite good and \( \theta \) defines the inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution.

Equation (13) is a Cobb-Douglas aggregator that describes the North composite good, \( \bar{C}_N \), in terms of North and South final goods, \( C_N \) and \( C_S^f \), respectively, both consumed in the North. In the same equation, parameter \( k \) corresponds to domestic expenditure-share.

The return to assets, \( a \), in the North is \( r_N \), and the wage rate is \( w \). One unit of labour is supplied inelastically during every period. The path of the value of assets, \( \dot{a} \), is represented in (14) as being the difference of labour and interest income minus Northern consumption expenditures, \( E_N \) (the budget constraint that is expressed as savings=income-consumption). The total Northern expenditures, \( E_N \), are described in equation (15).

As in Connolly and Valderrama (2005), and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), the consumption-based price index, \( \bar{P}_N \), is characterized as the minimum expenditure, \( E_N \), so that the composite good index, \( \bar{C}_N = 1 \), for a given set of prices:

\[ \bar{P}_N = \left( \frac{P_N}{k} \right)^k \left( \frac{P_S^f}{1-k} \right)^{1-k} \]  
(16)

From standard calculations, we obtain two expressions for consumer demands:

\[ C_N = k \frac{\bar{P}_N}{P_N} \bar{C}_N \]  
(17)

\[ C_S^f = (1-k) \frac{\bar{P}_N}{P_S^f} \bar{C}_N \]  
(18)

If we transfer these expressions to the household utility maximization problem, we arrive at the usual expression for consumption growth (the standard Euler equation):
\[ \frac{\dot{C}_N}{C_N} = \frac{1}{\theta} \left( r_N - \frac{\dot{P}_N}{P_N} - \rho \right) \]  

(19)

The problem of the Southern consumer is absolutely symmetric:

\[ \max_{\{C_N, C_S, \theta\}} \int_0^\infty u(\bar{C}_S)e^{-\rho t} \, dt \]  

(20)

\[ u(\bar{C}_S) = \left( \frac{\bar{C}_S^{1-\theta} - 1}{1 - \theta} \right) \]  

(21)

\[ \bar{C}_S = C_N^{1-\beta} C_S^\beta \]  

(22)

\[ \dot{\alpha} = r_S \alpha + w - E_S \]  

(23)

\[ E_S = P_S C_S + P_N^f C_N^f \]  

(24)

Assuming that both countries spend the same income share on the goods produced in the North, \( \beta = 1 - k \), the resulting expression for the Southern households’ demand is:

\[ \bar{P}_S = \left( \frac{P_N^f}{k} \right)^{\frac{(1-k)}{(1-k)}} \left( \frac{P_S}{1-k} \right)^{(1-k)} \]  

(25)

\[ C_N^f = k \frac{P_S}{P_N^f} C_S \]  

(26)

\[ C_S = (1-k) \frac{P_S}{P_N^f} C_S \]  

(27)

Additionally, hypothetically, the relative price of the South’s final good always adjusts to balance trade:

\[ P_S = \frac{P_N(1 + \tau_{YS}) C_N^f + P_N^f n_{NS} X_{NS}^f + P_N^f n_{NN} X_{NN}^f - P_N^f n_{NS} X_S^f}{(1 + \tau_Y) C_S^f} \]  

(28)

3. General Equilibrium

After describing the countries’ structures in our modelling setup, we go on to compute the equilibrium dynamics of technological knowledge which is responsible for economic growth in cases where neither labour nor human capital accumulation exist. The effects caused by the interaction between the North and South, deriving from international trade of intermediate goods, occupy an important position in the dynamics general equilibrium.
3.1. Equilibrium R&D

The expected current value of the flow of profits to the producer of \( j \), \( V(k, j, t) \),\(^{10} \) relies on the profits at \( t \), \( \Pi_S(k, j, t) \), on the equilibrium interest rate and on the expected duration of the flow (i.e. expected duration of research leadership). \( \Pi_S(k, j, t) \) depends on \( MC_N = 1 \), \( MC_S \), \( P_{NN}(j) \), \( P_{NS}(j) \), \( x_N(k, j, t) \) and \( x_S(k, j, t) \) and thus on trade. For example, the expected duration of the imitator’s leadership depends on \( I_N(k, j, t) \), which is the potential challenger, since the Southern entrant competes with a Northern incumbent). Thus, \( V_S(k, j, t) \) is:

\[
V_S(k, j, t) = \int_t^\infty \Pi_S(k, j, t) \exp \left[ - \int_t^s (r_S(v) + I_N(k, j, v)) dv \right] ds
\]  

(29)

where \( \Pi_S(k, j, t) \) using an imitation of the top quality \( k \) is:

\[
\Pi_S(k, j, t) = (1 - a)^{\alpha - 1} q^{\alpha - 1} \left[ (1 - MC_N) L_N(t) A_N^{\alpha - 1} + (1 + \tau x_S) (1 + \tau x_S) \right]^{\alpha - 1}
\]  

(30)

Differentiating (29) using Leibniz’s rule, we obtain the dynamic arbitrage equation:

\[
r_S(v) + I_N(k, j, v) = \frac{V_S(k, j, t)}{V_S(k, j, t)} \right( \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \right) ln q
\]  

(31)

Plugging (31) into the free entry R&D equilibrium condition, \( I_S(j, t) V_S(j, t) = y_S(j, t) \), and solving it for \( I_N \), we obtain the equilibrium probability of successful innovation, \( I_N \). Since the probability of successful innovation drives the technological knowledge progress, equilibrium can be transferred to the path of technological knowledge, from which free trade also allows the South to benefit. The relationship turns out to yield the well known expression for the equilibrium growth rate of \( Q_N \):

\[
\dot{Q}_N = I_N \left( q^{(1 - \alpha)\alpha - 1} - 1 \right).
\]  

(32)

3.2. Steady state

\(^{10}\) I.e., \( V(k, j, t) \) is the market value of the patent or the value of the monopolist firm, owned by consumers.
The steady state is characterised by constant growth, \( g^* \), common to both countries, and is driven by available technological knowledge progress,

\[
g^* = \dot{Q}_N = \dot{Y}_N = \dot{X}_N = \ddot{R}_N = \ddot{C}_N = \dot{\tilde{Q}}_L = \hat{e}^* = \frac{1}{\theta}(r^* - \rho) \quad (33)
\]

\( \Rightarrow \) in particular \( \dot{Q}_L = 0 \) and sector shares \( n_{NN}, n_{NS} \) and \( n_S \), will be constant.

Hence, the steady state growth rates of both countries depend exclusively on Northern technological progress, while the North remains the lead innovating country. Additionally, international trade and the succeeding risk of losing the market for a certain intermediate good to Southern imitation implies that the Northern rate of innovation depends on the Southern rate of imitation.

In steady state, \( \frac{\dot{v}_S(k,j,t)}{\dot{v}_S(k,j,t)} = k(j,t) \left( \frac{1-a}{a} \right) \ln q \) and thus, bearing in mind (10), (31) becomes:

\[
I_N = \beta_S \frac{e^\theta}{\zeta S_0} \bar{Q}^{\delta - \alpha} (1 - \alpha)^{\alpha - 1} \left[ (1 - MC_S)A_N^{\alpha - 1} + (1 + \tau_s - MC_S)I_S \left( \frac{MC_S}{1 + \tau_s} \right)^{\alpha - 1} \right] - r^* \quad (34)
\]

Equation (34) shows that the available (or Northern) technological knowledge progress:

(i) hinges on the returns to innovation, which in turn rely on terms of \( I_S, \beta_S \frac{e^\theta}{\zeta S_0} \bar{Q}^{\delta - \alpha} \), through inter country competition in intermediate goods. That is, the positive level effect from \( N \) to \( S \) (the access to the top quality intermediate goods increases production and thus the resources to imitative R&D) feeds back into \( N \), affecting \( Q_N \) by creative destruction;

(ii) is independent of its scale, since it is not affected by the rung of quality \( k \). Indeed, the positive influence of the quality rung on profits and on the learning effect is exactly offset by the negative influence on the complexity cost;\(^{11}\)

\(^{11}\)This is crucial for a symmetric equilibrium (on asymmetric equilibrium in quality ladder models and its growth consequences, see Cozzi et al., 2007).
(iii) is dependent on the market size effects.

Taking into account (32), (33) and (34), we can reach the steady state interest rate. Indeed, since steady state prices of non-tradable and tradable goods are constant as well as the growth rate of available technological knowledge, see (32) and (34), the common steady state interest rate, \( r^* \), is obtained:

\[
r^* = \left\{ \frac{\beta \frac{e^\theta}{\xi_\sigma} \theta^{d-\sigma}(1-\alpha)^{x-1} \left( (1-MC_1) A_1^{\alpha-1} + (1+\tau x - MC_2) A_2^{\alpha-1} \right)^{\sigma-1} \right\} \left( q^{(1-\alpha)x-1} - 1 \right) + \frac{1}{\bar{g}} \rho \tag{35} \]

Now, we can easily achieve the steady state growth rate by using the previous expression in the Euler equation:

\[
g^* = \frac{1}{\bar{g}} \left\{ \left( \frac{\beta \frac{e^\theta}{\xi_\sigma} \theta^{d-\sigma}(1-\alpha)^{x-1} \left( (1-MC_1) A_1^{\alpha-1} + (1+\tau x - MC_2) A_2^{\alpha-1} \right)^{\sigma-1} \right) \left( q^{(1-\alpha)x-1} - 1 \right) + \frac{1}{\bar{g}} \rho \right\}^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \tag{36} \]

The common steady state growth rates imply the persistence of a steady state North-South gap in technological knowledge. While total convergence in available technological knowledge is immediate with international trade (level effect), domestic levels may not converge totally; i.e. \( Q_N^* \) may stay below one.

In terms of steady state comparative static, and differentiating (36) with respect to IPR parameter (\( \delta \)), we achieve

\[
- \frac{e^\theta \xi_S}{\xi_\delta \delta^2} + \frac{e^\theta}{\xi_\delta \delta} \ln \tilde{Q}^* < 0, \quad \tilde{Q}^* \gamma - \sigma \left( - \frac{e^\theta \xi_S}{\xi_\delta \delta^2} + \frac{e^\theta}{\xi_\delta \delta} \ln \tilde{Q}^* \right) < 0
\]

and thus \( \frac{\partial g^*}{\partial \delta} < 0 \).

This result means that by increasing the IPR enforcement, the steady state growth rate decreases. In other words, in steady state, an increase in intellectual property protection (\( \delta \uparrow \)) leads to a decrease in the growth rate common to both countries (\( g \downarrow \)).

The rise in IPR makes imitation costly in the South, and as a result the probability of successful imitation decreases. As we above stated, this rise also has a negative effect on
the steady state probability of innovation, which supports the literature that argues that the IPR effect on economic growth is not always positive.

Moreover, as we have discussed above, this effect can be ambiguous. On the one hand, there are studies that argue for a positive relationship between IPR enforcement and economic growth (see for instance Falvey et al., 2009, and Chu et al., 2012), while others present a negative one, a result dependent on certain features or even an inconclusive result (see, e.g., Horii and Iwaisako, 2007; Datta and Mohtadi, 2006; Furukawa, 2010). On the other hand, in general, empirical evidence suggests a positive effect of IPR on economic growth (see Azevedo et al., 2012). However, this evidence can be justified by the empirical measure of patent protection most commonly used (e.g., Chu, 2009).

In this sense, we can say that the result is still pending. In the next section we will present the main conclusions of the paper and discuss the possibility of following some research avenues in the future.

4. Conclusions

The relationship between IPR and economic growth (or innovation) has been increasingly analysed in recent years, and IPR have become a common field of discussion in the literature relating to economic growth. However, the existing literature presents different results regarding the effect of IPR on economic growth, and some studies present distinct results under some constraints. Hence, we can conclude that this link is not clear.

In this paper, we have emphasized the importance of analysing IPR within an endogenous growth theoretical framework. Using as our motivation a brief account of the development of IPR literature, we have analysed the most commonly used mechanisms for introducing IPR into a model in an effort to better understand the connection between IPR and economic growth. Our general equilibrium endogenous growth model considers an IPR parameter in the function of the probability of imitation. We have also checked the
sign of the effect of IPR enforcement on economic growth and have discussed the differences between our result and those reported in the related literature.

In particular, by introducing the IPR parameter into the probability of imitation function we have made imitation more difficult; i.e. we have reduced the probability of imitation. Additionally, in the same function, we have introduced a negative relationship between the distance of each country from the technology frontier and IPR enforcement. This distance had a positive effect on the probability of successful imitation because the higher the distance of the country from the technology frontier (i.e. the lower is \( \bar{Q} \)), the higher the probability of imitation, \( I_S \). In the end, we found that IPR enforcement impacted negatively on the steady state growth rate.

Our main result is not in line with the most common results concerning the empirical evidence on the topic (see Azevedo et al., 2012). However, the existing literature is not consensual as regards the IPR effect on economic growth.

In this context, it should be stressed that our aim in this paper is not to impose the true sign of the relationship between IPR and economic growth but to develop an endogenous growth model in which IPR are introduced and in which they play a central role in the analysis.

This analysis suggests that there is much more work to be done in this field. In future research, it would be interesting to analyse, for example, the nature of the sign found differentiating (36) with respect to IPR parameter (\( \delta \)), because it can actually rely on countries’ development level. Hence, it would also be useful to discuss the different degrees of IPR protection according to the countries’ levels of development. The main argument supporting this idea is that each country, according to its stage of development, can have different necessities of innovation and imitation, so it will also have different needs in terms of IPR protection.
Another interesting study for future investigation is to verify whether, in countries where IPR laws do exist, they are strictly/effectively enforced, because afterwards it will be easier to understand the way in which the causality between IPR enforcement and economic development occurs. It will be easier to investigate whether these countries are less developed since they abide more strictly by the IPR laws, or whether on the contrary these countries do not adhere to IPR laws (for instance, because their institutions are weaker) or arrange a low level of protection to imitate the others in order to achieve more development. However, the latter case may lead to the opposite result and may be a possible cause of sluggish development in those countries which lag behind. Hence, it would be useful to ascertain what kind of countries most respect IPR enforcement.

References


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